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This paper uses nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine experiences and
fear of ethnic and racial harassment in public spaces among minorities in the UK,
comparing levels of both before and after the 2016 EU Referendum. We do not find an
increase in the prevalence of ethnic and racial harassment, but we do find higher levels
of fear of ethnic and racial harassment in the period after the Referendum. The increase
in fear following the vote was concentrated among more privileged individuals: those
with higher levels of education, and those living in less socioeconomically deprived areas
with lower levels of previous right-wing party support. We conclude that the Referendum
exacerbated already higher levels of perceived discrimination among higher educated
minorities while reducing the buffering effect of residence in “safe areas.”
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INTRODUCTION
There is emerging evidence that electoral events might influence dominant majority attitudes
toward out-group members, including ethnic and racial minorities. There is also substantial
evidence that media coverage of politicized events can heighten out-group hostility (Adena et al.,
2015), reinforcing existing prejudices and even creating new ones (Gavin, 2018). The heightened
salience of outgroup membership and increased hostility toward outgroup members which arises
from significant events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks or the Trump campaign has
further been shown to increase the prevalence of hate speech (Newman et al., 2020), actual acts
of hate crime (Frey, 2020) and discriminatory practices toward ethnic minorities (Rasul and
McConnell, 2020).
In this paper, we test whether one such politicized event—the 2016 EU Referendum– increased
reports of ethnic and racial harassment (physical or verbal attacks perceived by the victim to be
due to their race, ethnicity, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance) in public places as
well as fear of such harassment for both white and non-white ethnic minorities in the UK. We
are interested in both the actual experience of harassment as well as fear of such experiences as
prior research has shown that both can have detrimental effect on mental health (Nandi et al.,
2016, 2020). In addition to improving our understanding of the effect of racially politicized events
on outgroup attitudes and discriminatory practices, our aim with this study was to provide an
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updated account of experiences and fear of ethnic and racial
harassment in British society following the EU Referendum vote.
The primary debate about the consequences of this event on
the British population has been the expected economic costs
after leaving the EU, but less attention has been paid to a
potential change in the experiences and feeling of safety for
ethnic minorities.
An increase in racially motivated hate crimes based on police
reports following the EU referendum has been well-documented
(Carr et al., 2020; Home Office, 2020). Carr et al. (2020)
also show that this increase was unlikely due to increases in
reporting alone but rather due to changes in social sanctions
against discriminatory attitudes, alongside inflammatory media
reporting, that allowed for more actual acts of hate crime.
However, as these reports and papers are based on police reports
of hate crimes they do not capture milder forms of harassment
that would be unlikely to be reported to the police or when
reported would be counted as hate incidents and not hate
crimes (as these may not constitute a criminal offense). Police
reports will also not be able to capture fear of ethnic and
racial harassment.
Our first contribution, in this paper, is to provide a more
complete picture of potential changes in the environment for
England’s ethnic minorities following the EU Referendum vote,
by examining both harsher and milder forms of ethnic and
racial harassment as well as reports of fear of experiencing
such harassment. To do this we use data from Understanding
Society: the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), which
interviews a nationally representative sample of UK residents
every year and asks a sub-sample comprising primarily of ethnic
minorities and immigrants a series of questions about various
aspects of their experience of harassment including feeling
unsafe. As the EU Referendum was on 23rd June 2016, in our
analysis we use data collected from January 2015 until early 2019
(fieldwork runs throughout the year).
Our second contribution is providing representative [for
England] estimates of these changes from before and after the
EU Referendum, by using data from Understanding Society
and by using appropriate weights to account for non-response
bias. Whereas, estimates based on police reports suffer from
reporting bias, as individuals non-randomly select into self-
reports of hate crime to the police, our use of a nationally
representative sampling framewith appropriate weights results in
population level estimates of experiences and fear of ethnic and
racial harassment. Third, by considering a longer time-period we
argue that this analysis tests for a more general change in tone
and incivility following the EU Referendum vote. Finally, as the
UKHLS asks a vast array of questions about almost every aspect
of a person’s life, we are able to measure heterogeneity of this
effect, which in turn allows us to test hypothesized mechanisms
that could explain the relationship between the EU Referendum
and ethnic and racial harassment.
Background and Hypotheses
There is an established body of work that documents a
relationship between electoral events such as the EU Referendum
or Brexit vote and changes in attitudes and behaviors
(Leduc, 2002). One such behavior that has recently received
substantial research attention is racially motivated hate crime
and hate incidents. A hate crime is defined by British law as
“Any criminal offense which is perceived by the victim or any
other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based
on a person’s race or perceived race; religion or perceived
religion; sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation;
disability or perceived disability and any crime motivated by
hostility or prejudice against a person who is transgender or
perceived to be transgender” (Metropolitan Police, 2020). A
hate incident is defined as any incident that is perceived as
motivated by one of these characteristics, and while these
may not be criminal in character, can still be reported and
documented by the police. Hate incidents are not included
in the statistics on hate crimes published by the Home Office
(e.g., see Home Office, 2020). In this paper, we examine the
pre- and post-Referendum prevalence of a related concept,
ethnic and racial harassment, through the perspective of the
victim; that is through self-reports of experiences of verbal or
physical attacks in public places that the victim attributes to
their ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or
appearance. Our measure of these incidents does not include
any reference to a crime and so need not be severe enough to
constitute a criminal offense and hence a hate crime. In taking
the victim’s perspective, we are also interested in how Brexit
may have influenced feelings of vulnerability in public spaces
by white and non-white ethnic minorities, which we measure
as reports of feeling unsafe or avoiding public places because of
these same characteristics.
Theories of social or group-based identities, developed by
social psychologists, have long established the existence of
favorable attitudes and behavior toward in-group members and
discriminatory practices toward out-group members (Tajfel,
1981). Sociologists (Bobo, 1999) and economists (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000) discuss how these individual preferences,
produced and strengthened by group-based identities, operate
in the aggregate to shape ethnic inequality in life chances, as
well as perpetration of and exposure to discriminatory acts. In
times of increased competition for scarce resources, as well as
opportunities and events that heighten the salience of social
identities such as the EU Referendum, these prejudicial attitudes
may strengthen, leading to increases in hate crimes and incidents
[for a review see (Luthra and Nandi, 2020)].
Populist electoral events and parties increase the salience of
in-group identities by framing an “in-group” of the “people”
against a notion of a corrupt “elite,” an in-group that can be
based on cultural, political or class basis (Kriesi, 2014). The
EU Referendum has been widely defined as a populist electoral
event, as the Leave campaign portrayed leaving the EU as the
preservation of British sovereignty against Brussels elites and
built on a nativist turn away from multiculturalism and toward
“British values” (Cutts et al., 2011). The campaign was highly
polarizing and increased the saliency of British national identities
as well as the salience of immigrants as out-group members in
the UK (Henderson et al., 2017). The campaign squarely placed
EUmembership as a cause of both cultural and economic decline
in Britain (Davis et al., 2019), fomenting popular perceptions of
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competition for scarce resources with “uncontrolled” migration
from the EU serving as the primary mediator of this threat.
Whether this increase in saliency directly led to increases in
ethnic and racial harassment in the UK remains unclear. On one
hand, official hate crime data from the UK Home Office shows
a sharp increase in reports of ethnically motivated hate crime in
the lead up to and directly following the Referendum, and this
increase does not appear to be explained by changes to reporting
alone. Using hate crime data aggregated at local levels, researchers
find that the post-Referendum increase is higher than would be
expected based on general demographic and seasonal reporting
models, and that it is higher in areas that voted more strongly in
favor of leaving the EU. The authors of these studies argue that
the increase can be linked to a general shift in attitudes toward
out-group members and that Brexit support signaled tolerance
for racially motivated abusive behavior (Albornoz et al., 2020);
they also find that media coverage of both hate crime and the
Referendum itself are associated with small spikes in hate crime
reporting (Carr et al., 2020). These studies, on the other hand,
also find that the spike in hate crime reporting is generally short
lived—concentrated in the quarter following the Referendum.
This fits previous research which finds that hate crimes are often
linked to an antecedent event, conceptualized as a reaction when
a highly publicized event stokes anti-outgroup sentiment, and are
often short in duration and strongest when a specific group is
highlighted (King and Sutton, 2013).
While police reports of hate crime cover the more egregious
acts of hostility against minorities, research which relies on this
data alone naturally misses more minor forms of harassment
and it is possible that increases in hate crime are short-lived
and do not reflect more general change in majority attitudes
and behaviors toward ethnic minorities. For instance, research
which attempts to address whether the spike in police reported
hate crimes is also mirrored in more population level self-
reported attitudes is mixed. Schwartz et al. (2020) demonstrate
that among those who voted Leave, anti-immigrant sentiment
actually softened following the EU Referendum due to a greater
sense of control, and that fears of appearing xenophobic or racist
softened anti-immigrant sentiment among both Leavers and
Remainers. Using experimental evidence designed to uncover
hidden attitudes due to social desirability bias, other research
has shown that while overt expressions of prejudice against
for instance Muslim immigrants had declined following the
EU Referendum vote, more covert measures of discrimination
remained (Creighton and Jamal, 2020).
Thus, the evidence on whether this campaign actually caused
an increase in xenophobic and racist sentiment is equivocal, and
current research linking the EU Referendum vote to hate crime
specifically thus far focuses on police reports, which include only
those forms of ethnic and racial harassment which constitute
a criminal offense and which undercount the actual incidence
of hate crime and hate incidents. For instance, the number of
racially motivated hate crimes reported to the police increased
from around 49,000 in 2015/16 to around 71,000 in 2017/18
while the estimated number of racially motivated incidents and
hate crimes during this period based on the Crime Survey of
England andWales (CSEW), a nationally representative survey of
victimization, was around 100,000 per year (Home Office, 2018).
Even the CSEW uses at best a restricted definition of ethnic and
racial harassment, as respondents are first asked whether they
have been a victim of a crime and are only then followed up
with a question on whether this crime was racially motivated.
They will thus not report milder forms of harassment such as
being insulted. To illustrate this point, earlier comparisons of
CSEW estimates of hate crime with the more expanded definition
of ethnic and racial harassment that we use here show that the
(weighted) estimate of the proportion of ethnic minorities who
report being the victim of at least one racially motivated crime in
the past year during 2008–2016 based on CSEW is 2.3%, while the
(weighted) estimate of the proportion of ethnic minorities who
reported being physically or verbally attacked because of their
ethnicity, religion or nationality in a public place in the past year
during 2009–2015 is 10–20% for men and women of different
ethnic groups (Nandi and Luthra, 2016).
In terms of the lived experiences of immigrants and ethnic
minorities in the UK, it is also important to consider how the
EU Referendum might have increased both harsher and milder
forms of ethnic and racial harassment as well as their perceptions
of hostility of the majority group toward them and consequently
their own feelings of vulnerability. For this we need a victim-
centered approach, examining not only hate crime as reported
to the police, but also general reports of hostility. Most of
this work has taken the form of qualitative interviews, which
demonstrates increased feelings of unwelcome and vulnerability
in the run-up to and following the EU Referendum. The
vote made visible existing economic and social vulnerabilities
among EU migrants as well as created new ones (Burrell and
Schweyher, 2019), and qualitative accounts document how the
EU Referendum exposed EU migrants to common experiences
for third-country migrants which may have been invisible
to them before—for instance the experience of monitoring
from their employers (Manthorpe et al., 2018; Luthra, 2021),
navigating bureaucratic requirements to secure legal permanent
residency or citizenship (McGhee et al., 2017), and fraught
interactions with the Home Office (Yuval-Davis et al., 2017).
The vote also created, or heightened, feelings of hostility and
unwelcome, with respondents reporting an increase in awareness
of anti-immigrant hate crimes (Rzepnikowska, 2019) as well as
a disruption of feelings of belonging and sense of personhood
among long-standing EU residents in the UK (Guma and Dafydd
Jones, 2019).
Moreover, there is some evidence that negative press coverage
of some out-groups, in this case EU immigrants, can also
“spillover” into greater hostility toward other minorities. For
example, US researchers have demonstrated that negative media
portrayals linking Islamophobia and immigration following the
9/11 attacks (Romero and Zarrugh, 2018) resulted in longer
prison sentences for minority group members perceived as
immigrants (Rasul and McConnell, 2020). Analysis of a recent
survey of mental health among migrants of all origins in the
UK demonstrate how an increase in minority stress and social
stigma, mediated via increased experiences of discrimination
following the Referendum, resulted in worse mental health for
both EU and non-EU migrants (Frost, 2020). Similar to work
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with police data, the reported increases in discrimination and
mental ill health were higher in areas with more Leave voters.
Given existing evidence that suggests a positive relationship
between events which increase the saliency of in-group identities
and heighten feelings of animosity toward and competition
with out-group members, we further expect that the EU
Referendum may increase feelings of unwelcome and exposure
to ethnic and racial harassment among other out-groups in
the UK, namely ethnic and racial minority immigrants and
their descendants.
H1: The EU Referendum will be associated with an increase
in reports of experience and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
for EU immigrants as well as non-white immigrants and
their descendants.
Beyond a general increase in ethnic and racial harassment and
feeling unsafe following the EU Referendum among minorities
in the UK, we might also expect both individual and community
level variation in this association. Several scholars have noted
how “diverse histories and geographies of marginality and
privilege shape responses to and impacts of Brexit” (Botterill
et al., 2019, p. 2). Many of these scholars have pointed to
individual level characteristics, such as labor market position,
social class (Lulle et al., 2019) and race (Benson and Lewis, 2019),
to argue that vulnerabilities to the EU Referendum can align with
existing stratification.
Previous research on the fear of victimization and actual
victimization in the general population uncovers a paradox
in terms of age and gender: although older individuals and
women generally report lower levels of victimization then men
and younger individuals, women and older individuals still
report higher levels of fear of crime (Stafford and Galle, 1984;
Smith and Tortensson, 1997). These scholars point toward the
greater physical vulnerability of women (Smith and Tortensson,
1997) and older individuals (De Donder et al., 2005), as well
as underreporting and discounting of fear by men (Sutton
and Farrall, 2005), to understand this paradox. Specifically
in terms of discrimination and racially motivated crime, a
body of work also demonstrates a further paradox in that
minorities of higher socio-economic standing also report higher
rates of discrimination (de Vroome et al., 2014; Steinmann,
2019), likely for the reason that they have higher expectations
of fair treatment and their higher socioeconomic position puts
them in greater contact with the majority group. Evidence
of this “integration paradox” has similarly been demonstrated
in the UK in work that finds higher reports of ethnic and
racial harassment among ethnic minority men, those who are
younger, and are more highly educated (Nandi and Luthra,
2016), but that feelings of unsafety are primarily stratified
by sex, with women reporting higher levels of fear of ethnic
and racial harassment. Drawing on this previous research, we
might expect that the EU Referendum will exacerbate existing
inequalities in exposure to ethnic and racial harassment and
feelings of unsafety:
H2: The EU Referendum will be associated with an increase in
reports of ethnic and racial harassment among younger and male
ethnic minorities, but an increase in reports of fear of ethnic and
racial harassment among older and women ethnic minorities.
H3: The EU Referendum will be associated with an increase
in reports of experiences and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
among ethnic minorities of higher socio-economic status.
Finally, although spillover effects are noted in the literature
and media coverage of the EU Referendum often conflated
the Referendum with immigration policy in general (Walter,
2019), we do know that free movement and Euroscepticism
were particularly targeted in the Leave campaign immediately
preceding the vote (Morrison, 2019). Thus, any post-Referendum
increase in experiences or fear of ethnic and racial harassment
may be stronger for those of European origins:
H4: The EU Referendum will be associated with a higher
increase in experiences and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
for European immigrants than for other minorities.
Hypotheses 2–4 anticipate individual level variation in the
association between the EU Referendum, ethnic and racial
harassment, and fear of ethnic and racial harassment. However,
there may be variation in these associations across different
communities as well. First, criminological research on both
hate crime and fear suggest that they should be higher
in areas that are more economically deprived. In terms of
neighborhood deprivation and fear of crime, a well-established
perspective on the meso- or ecological determinants of fear of
crime concerns the role of “social disorganization”—including
exposure to incivilities, physical infrastructure, visible signs
of disorder, as well as actual local victimization rates—at the
local level as being a major determinant of fear of crime.
These factors are often proxied by the index of multiple
deprivation, which is an aggregated measure of many forms of
socioeconomic vulnerability that are correlated with the physical
environment and exposure to disorder and incivilities at the
neighborhood level. Neighborhood level characteristics often
moderate relationships with fear of crime (Brunton-Smith and
Sturgis, 2011) and thus it follows that they may moderate fear
response to the Referendum vote as well.
Beyond perceptions of crime, criminological research also
documents a clear association between area deprivation and
crime (Peterson et al., 2000). Drawing on General Strain Theory
(Agnew, 2014), crime is expected to be higher in areas where
there is a concentration of individuals experiencing multiple
barriers to achieving desired social goals such as financial security
or respect, where social control is low, and where there is greater
opportunity for the social learning of crime. Related sociological
and economic theories of realistic conflict similarly suggest that
living in deprived areas gives rise to a greater sense of inter-
group conflict over scarce resources (Sniderman et al., 2004;
Zárate et al., 2004), which also should lead to higher levels of hate
crime and discrimination. Current evidence using police reports
of hate crime (Home Office, 2020) as well as ethnic and racial
harassment as we define it here (Nandi et al., 2016) corresponds
to these theoretical expectations, consistently finding higher rates
of victimization in more deprived areas.
Second, in addition to general indicators of deprivation, we
might also expect that the ethnic composition of the local
area will influence exposure to harassment as well as fear.
Previous research has established that the risk of ethnic and
racial harassment is lower in areas with higher proportions
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 660286
Nandi and Luthra EU Referendum, Harassment, and Fear
of ethnic minorities (Dustmann et al., 2011). Whether general
deprivation and co-ethnic composition also means an increased
negative impact of the EU Referendum is however less clear.
Research on the effect of perceived threat heightening events
such as the EU Referendum on hate crime turn instead to
more proximate measures of out-group hostility as potential
community level moderators, which can be positively correlated
with deprivation but are conceptually distinct. For instance,
emerging research about the effect of the EU Referendum
on hate crimes using police reports show higher increases in
hate crime in areas that had a higher proportion of Leave
voters (Carr et al., 2020). These authors suggest that the EU
Referendum made what was likely somewhat hidden (due to
social norms) anti-immigrant bias public, changing the social
norms around expression of anti-immigrant sentiment and thus
lowering the informal costs of committing hate crime. Qualitative
research on changes in perceptions of hostility following the
EU Referendum also find community level variation in its
effects, for instance experiences of increased vulnerability in
neighborhoods perceived as dominated by white working class
“others” (Rzepnikowska, 2019) or in devolved regions such as
Wales (Guma and Dafydd Jones, 2019) as contrasted to the
more diverse and accepting “Eurocity” of London (Favell, 2011;
Lulle et al., 2019). Existing research thus leads us to expect a
more pronounced EU Referendum effect in areas which are more
deprived, have a lower proportion of co-ethnic residents, and
have stronger support for anti-immigrant sentiment.
H5: The EU Referendum will be associated with a stronger
increase in experiences and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
in deprived areas, in areas with a lower proportion of co-ethnic
residents, and in areas with previous right-wing electoral support.
DATA AND METHODS
Methods
We estimate models of the likelihood of reporting experiences
and fear of ethnic and racial harassment using logistic regression.
We use longitudinal weights to account for differential selection
probability and non-random attrition and estimate standard
errors after taking into account the complex survey design
which is clustered and stratified. As the models include the
general health question which was asked in a self-completion
questionnaire we use self-completion longitudinal weights that
account for non-random response to this part of the survey.
The statistical software package we used was STATA version 16.
We estimated the models using the logit command with the svy
prefix suite of commands that allow accounting for weights and
sample design. The average marginal effects (AMEs) reported
in the tables are produced using the post-estimation command
margin, and in models where a variable was interacted with the
EU Referendum dummy, contrast was used to test the difference
in AME for different categories of the variable with the AME
of the reference category reported as a reference point. For the
categorical variables we use here, AME are the average (across
the sample) increase or decrease in an estimated probability of
the event for different categories of the variable as compared to a
reference category. In non-linear models like logit, this is a better
way to show the effect of a variable on the outcome particularly
when including interactions (Norton and Ai, 2003).
First, we estimate these models only for the pre-Referendum
period to identify how experiences of ethnic and racial
harassment and fear of ethnic and racial harassment was
distributed across the population. Second, we estimate these
models for the pre and post EU Referendum period including
a post-Referendum indicator (without any controls) to estimate
change from the pre- to post-Referendum period. Third, we re-
estimate these models with the variables included in the pre-
Referendum models interacting with each variable separately
to identify heterogeneity in changes in experiences and fear
of ethnic and racial harassment. As the EU Referendum was
a random event unrelated to any individual or subnational
characteristics, we did not need to include any controls in
our models to examine the difference in experiences and fear
of ethnic and racial harassment post-Referendum, our first
hypothesis. However, to assess hypotheses H2-H5, which posit
heterogeneity in changes in experiences and fear of ethnic
and racial harassment post-Referendum, we interacted the
EU Referendum indicator with several individual level and
community level characteristics which were all included as
controls to be able to estimate the net effects.
Fourth, to test for the robustness of our findings, we
also allowed for temporal variation in post-Brexit changes to
experiences or fear of ethnic and racial harassment. First, as
previous research on changes in attitudes or discriminatory acts
following electoral events generally finds that such changes are
short-lived (Cappiali et al., 2018; Schilter, 2020), we tested for
changes in experiences of and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
across different periods following the EU Referendum. We
partitioned the post referendum observation window into four
6 months periods (smaller time periods would have resulted
in very small sample sizes) and assessed for variation in post-
Brexit changes across time. The four post referendum periods are
July-December 2016, January-June 2017, July-December 2017,
January-June 2018, July-December 2018 (this includes a few
interviews in 2019). Finally, to allow for the fact that our
measures of experience and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
refer to experiences in the previous 12 months, as further
sensitivity test, we also excluded survey respondents who replied
to the question within 12 months of the Referendum vote (June
2016), so that the reports of experiences and fear of harassment
included in the analysis only refer to the post-Brexit period.
Data
We use data from Understanding Society (University of Essex,
2020)1, a longitudinal household survey that began in 2009,
primarily drawing on waves nine and nine which bracket the
2016 EU Referendum over the period 2015–20182. The sample is
comprised of a nationally representative sample of around 26,000
1Ethical approval statements are available here.
2Most of the interviews took place between January 2015 and December 2018, but
if some respondents could not be contacted during the intended fieldwork period,
they were contacted and interviewed in the early part of 2019. Throughout this
paper we will report the period of study as 2015–2018 as that is when most of the
interviews took place.
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households (General Population Sample, GPS) and an ethnic
minority boost sample (EMBS) of 4,000 households where at least
one person was from an ethnic minority background. In 2015, an
Immigrant and EthnicMinority boost sample (IEMBS) of around
2,500 households was added. A household qualified for inclusion
if at least one household member was born outside the UK or
was from an ethnic minority background (same criterion as for
the EMBS). Households selected into these samples are randomly
assigned to monthly or quarterly samples which determines
their interview and fieldwork period and every year they are
interviewed in that specific month or quarter (Lynn, 2009).
While sample members can choose when they would like to
be interviewed, the dates are constrained within their randomly
assigned months or quarters.
Every year respondents in the sampled households who are 16
or above are asked questions about different aspects of their lives
including parental and family background, socio-demographic
characteristics, education, labor market experience, income and
wealth, health and wellbeing, attitudes, values and beliefs. A
sub-sample, known as the “extra 5min sample” comprising
primarily ethnic minorities and immigrants, are asked 5min
worth of additional questions. InWaves seven and nine, covering
the interview period 2015–2018, this includes questions about
experiences of harassment. See (McFall et al., 2020) for further
details about the screening questions, the design for the boost
samples and the composition of the extra 5 min sample.
As the goal of this paper is to examine changes in ethnic and
racial harassment and fear among ethnic minorities, we exclude
all respondents who identify as White British from our sample.
Using the residential location of the sample members, we
match the survey data with Census 2011 data on number of
adults from different ethnic groups at the Lower Super Output
Area (LSOA). LSOAs are areas with around 650 households and
1,500 individuals and we consider these areas to be proxies for
neighborhoods of respondents in the study. We also match the
survey data with the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)
at the LSOA level. The English IMD 2010 is computed at the
LSOA level by combining levels of seven domains of deprivation
(income, employment, health and disability, education skills and
training, barriers to housing and other services, crime and living
environment) using 38 individual measures with each domain
weighted appropriately. As this measure is not compatible across
countries of the UK, we restricted the analysis to England where
94% of UK’s ethnic minorities live3. Finally, using data from the
2015 General Election data at the parliamentary constituency
level available from the Electoral Commission4, we match the
proportion of the electorate who voted for populist right wing
parties—UK Independence Party or the British National Party
(BNP) (Cutts et al., 2011; Goodwin, 2011)—in the 2015 general
election as a proxy for existing hostility from a period prior to the
Referendum campaign.
3See Available online at: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/ for England
and Wales, https://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/ for Scotland and https://
www.nisra.gov.uk/publications/2011-census-key-statistics-northern-ireland for
Northern Ireland Census 2011 statistics.
4Available online at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/media/3016.
Variable Descriptions
Ethnic and Racial Harassment and Feeling Unsafe
The harassment module includes four sets of questions
which follow the same pattern. Each set starts with one of
these questions:
• “In the last 12 months, have you felt unsafe in any of the places
listed on this card? If so, which ones?”
• “In the last 12 months, have you avoided going to or being in
any of the places listed on the card? If so, which ones?”
• “In the last 12 months, have you been insulted, called names,
threatened or shouted at, in any of the places listed on this
card? If so, which ones?”
• “In the last 12 months, have you been physically attacked in
any of the places listed on this card? If so, which ones?”
If the respondent then chose one of the places listed on the card
(Home, School, Colleges or Universities, Work, Streets, Shops,
Public transport, Stations, Taxis, other places) they are asked a
follow up question about the reasons they think this happened.
The possible reasons they could choose from were (they could
choose more than one reason):
Your sex, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, health or disability,
nationality, religion, language or accent, dress, or appearance,
none of the above (spontaneous), other reason.
We defined a person to have experienced ethnic and racial
harassment if they reported being physically attacked or insulted
in at least one place other than their home, school, university or
place of work and if they chose ethnicity, nationality, religion,
language or accent, or dress or appearance as one of the reasons.
It is clear from the question text that our definition of ethnic and
racial harassment does not require the incident to be identified as
a criminal offense.
We defined a person to feel unsafe for fear of ethnic or racial
harassment if they reported feeling unsafe in at least one (public)
place other than their home, school, university or place of work
and if they chose ethnicity, nationality, religion, language or
accent, or dress or appearance, as one of the reasons. Although
“dress or appearance” and “Language or accent” are less explicitly
tied to race and ethnicity, we included these characteristics as
they are more salient for European origin respondents.
The EU Referendum
We compare experiences and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
before and after the EU Referendum by including an indicator
variable which takes on the value 1 if the respondent was
interviewed after 23 June 2016 and 0 otherwise.
Individual and Community Level Moderators
Age and Sex
Age is measured in years as of the date of the interview. Dates
of birth and sex are as reported by the respondent or their
household members if not self-reported. To test H2, these two
variables are interacted with the Referendum indicator.
Socioeconomic Status
We include two measures of socioeconomic status. The first is
educational attainment, dichotomized as those with and without
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a university level degree or higher. We also included a category
for those with missing education information. In the wave that
the IEMB sample was added (Wave 6, 2015), adult respondents
who had received their qualification outside the UK were asked
an educational qualification question with a different set of
response categories. As a result their educational qualification
variable was missing unless they acquired a qualification in the
UK since then. In an alternate version we coded those who
had chosen categories closest to a “first degree or higher” as
having received a degree. In this harmonised version of the degree
variable there were only around 40 cases with missing value for
the degree variable. The second is equivalized gross household
income, the gross monthly income reported at the household
level, equalities for household size and composition with the
modified OECD equivalence scale5 and entered into the model
in quintiles. These two interactions are used to test H3.
Ethnic and Immigration Background
We exclude those who identify as White—British, English,
Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish. To address potential
heterogeneity in the EU Referendum effect for those most
targeted in xenophobic rhetoric surrounding the Leave campaign
(H4), we identify those who were born in the original 15 EU
member states and those born in the more recent accession
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, who joined in 2004, and Bulgaria
and Romania, who joined the EU in 2007). We also separate all
non-white ethnic minority individuals into those who were born
in the UK and those born outside as the second generation may
have different experiences and perceptions of harassment and
fear. The remaining sample are included into a residual “other
category.” This group is comprised mostly of “White: Other”
respondents born in non-EU countries (∼65%), and “White:
Other” respondents born in UK (∼20%).
Local Area Characteristics
Local area deprivation is measured using the Index of Multiple
Deprivation at the LSOA level as described in the data
section above. The continuous measure is categorized into
quartiles. Previous right-wing electoral support is measured
as the voter share at LSOA level for the BNP and UKIP
parties in the 2015 general election, as described above. We
categorized this continuous measure into quartiles. Finally, co-
ethnic composition is measured as the proportion of residents
reporting the same ethnic group (measured by the 2011 Census
ethnic group question which was asked of Understanding Society
respondents as well) as the respondent at the LSOA level using
data from the 2011 Census. As White British residents make up
to 80% of England’s population, they mostly live in areas with
other White British residents. So, categorizing this measure for
all respondents would have resulted in ethnic minorities living
mostly in the lowest quartiles. Thus, to be able measure variation
across areas in our sample of ethnic minorities we categorized
5Understanding Society provides a variable in each wave, which equals the
modified OECD equivalence scale, computed using information on household
size and composition and OECD equivalence scale guidelines: Available online at:
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf.
this continuous measure into quartiles by only considering the
areas with ethnic minority respondents (unlike for the local area
deprivation and right wing support measures).
Controls
We also include controls for general health, full-time student
status and partnership status in these models. General health is
measured via self-reported health which asks respondents “In
general, would you say your health is. . . ” and we dichotomize
the results, with those reporting excellent, very good or good
health scoring one and those with fair or poor health scoring zero.
The partnership status variable is a 0–1 indicator for whether the
respondent is married or cohabiting vs. those who do not live
with a partner. Finally, we include a 0–1 indicator for respondents
who are full-time students.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The sample comprises of ethnic minorities living in England
who were interviewed between 2015 and 19. In Table 1 we
show the descriptive statistics for our sample, before and
after the EU Referendum. The first two columns include
unweighted proportions and thus describe the sample. The
third and fourth columns show weighted proportions and
thus provide population estimates before and after the EU
Referendum. Weighted estimates show a higher proportion
of ethnic minorities reporting fear of ethnic and racial
harassment after EU Referendum (7 vs. 9%, and this difference
was statistically significant) but no difference in report of
experiences of ethnic and racial harassment (5%). We find one
or two percentage point differences in pre and post Brexit
compositions for most individual and area level characteristics,
but none of these differences are statistically significant except
for the one percentage point decrease in the proportion of
“other” immigrants.
Prevalence of Experiences and Fear of
Ethnic and Racial Harassment Before the
EU Referendum
InTable 2, we present results from estimation of models of ethnic
and racial harassment (respondent reported being physically or
verbally attacked in a public place in the last 12 months and
attributed this to their ethnicity, religion, nationality, language or
accent, dress or appearance) among England’s ethnic minorities
in the pre- EU Referendum period (2015-−23rd June 2016).
We find that in this period, non-white ethnic minorities were
more likely to report experiencing ethnic and racial harassment:
UK born non-white minorities were 5% points more likely, and
foreign born non-white minorities 3% points more likely, to
report ethnic and racial harassment than EU15 minorities in the
period prior to the EU referendum vote (although the difference
for UK born minorities is not statistically significant). In line
with previous research based on data from the late 1990s and
2009–2015 (Dustmann et al., 2011; Nandi et al., 2016), we find
that ethnic minorities living in areas with a higher proportion
of co-ethnic residents report lower levels of ethnic and racial
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
Unweighted Weighted
Before After Before After p-value of test of
difference
The EU Referendum
Physically or verbally attacked in public places in the past 12 months due to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance
No 95% 94% 95% 95% 0.714
Yes 5% 6% 5% 5%
Felt unsafe in public places the past 12 months due to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance
No 92% 88% 93% 91% 0.002
Yes 8% 12% 7% 09%
Gender
Men 41% 43% 44% 46% 0.158
Women 59% 57% 56% 54%
Age group
16–19 years 8% 8% 10% 9% 0.457
20–29 years 14% 16% 16% 17% 0.507
30–39 years 21% 21% 23% 23% 0.988
40–49 years 23% 22% 23% 22% 0.559
50–59 years 17% 16% 15% 14% 0.903
60+ years 17% 16% 14% 15% 0.258
Highest educational qualifications
No college degree 62% 60% 61% 58% 0.056
College degree or higher 32% 32% 35% 37% 0.200
Information missing 6% 8% 4% 5% 0.337
Equivalised gross household income
Lowest quintile 21% 20% 18% 15% 0.344
2nd quintile 20% 20% 20% 18% 0.414
3rd quintile 20% 20% 19% 19% 0.829
4th quintile 17% 19% 17% 20% 0.125
Highest quintile 22% 22% 26% 27% 0.474
Ethnic and immigration background
Born in EU15 8% 6% 13% 11% 0.173
Born in A2A8 5% 6% 8% 10% 0.143
Non-white ethnic minorities, born in UK 29% 31% 23% 24% 0.430
Non-white ethnic minorities, born outside UK 47% 47% 38% 38% 0.959
Other 11% 9% 18% 16% 0.018
Deprivation level in the neighborhood or LSOA
Lowest quartile 15% 14% 24% 23% 0.485
2nd quartile 19% 18% 26% 24% 0.112
3rd quartile 27% 28% 22% 24% 0.347
Highest quartile 39% 41% 27% 30% 0.174
Proportion of co-ethnic residents in the neighborhood or LSOA
Lowest quartile 22% 23% 30% 32% 0.490
2nd quartile 26% 22% 27% 25% 0.401
3rd quartile 21% 24% 17% 18% 0.465
Highest quartile 31% 30% 26% 25% 0.568
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Unweighted Weighted
Before After Before After p-value of test of
difference
The EU Referendum
Proportion of voters in the parliamentary constituency who voted for UKIP or BNP in the 2015 General Elections
Lowest quartile 34% 34% 29% 30% 0.724
2nd quartile 30% 28% 25% 25% 0.926
3rd quartile 20% 18% 26% 25% 0.391
Highest quartile 16% 20% 19% 20% 0.762
Married or cohabiting?
No 40% 40% 40% 41% 0.658
Yes 60% 60% 60% 59%
General health
Fair or poor 19% 19% 16% 16% 0.884
Food, very good or excellent 81% 81% 84% 84%
Full-time student?
No 90% 89% 88% 88% 0.719
Yes 10% 11% 12% 12%
Number of observations 3,004 7,513 3,004 7,513
Data: Understanding Society (Waves 7 and 9, 2015–2019).
harassment. As expected, we find that ethnic minorities living in
areas with a higher proportion of right wing voters, specifically
the highest quartile, are more likely to experience ethnic and
racial harassment (although this difference is not statistically
significant). This is also consistent with findings by Nandi and
Luthra (2016) for the period 2009–2015.
We next estimated models of feeling unsafe in public places
attributed to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language or
accent, dress or appearance during the pre- EU Referendum
period (See the right-hand columns of Table 2). We find that
ethnic minority women and those living in more deprived areas
are more likely to report fear of ethnic and racial harassment.
We also find that compared to migrants from EU-15 countries,
migrants from A2 and A8 countries are more likely to report
feeling unsafe although we did not find a statistically significant
difference in their reporting of ethnic and racial harassment.
Non-white ethnic minorities are also more likely to report feeling
unsafe than EU15migrants, as we find to be the case for reporting
of ethnic and racial harassment. As with actual experiences, we
find that ethnic minorities living in areas with lower proportion
of co-ethnic residents and higher proportion of right-wing voters
are more likely to feel unsafe.
Changes in Experiences and Fear of Ethnic
and Racial Harassment After the EU
Referendum
In Table 3, we report the estimated difference in experiences
and fear of ethnic and racial harassment after the Referendum
for all ethnic minorities and by different sub-groups. To show
the difference in the effect of the Referendum for different sub-
groups, we include interactions of the Referendum indicator
with each of the variables identifying different subgroups (one
at a time) and the AMEs in this table are the AME of Brexit
for each category of the variable being interacted. We test
whether any change in experiences or fear of ethnic and racial
harassment after the EU referendum varied across individuals
of different characteristics or for those residing in different
types of localities. We report the degree of statistical significance
of the test of these differences by sub-groups vis-à-vis the
reference category.
Beginning with the first hypothesis, we do not find an overall
increase in experiences of ethnic and racial harassment in the
period following the Referendum in contrast to our expectation
in Hypothesis 1. We do, however, find a statistically significant
increase in fear of ethnic and racial harassment: the predicted
probability of fearing ethnic and racial harassment was 0.07 prior
to the Referendum, and increased three percentage points to 0.10
thereafter. Thus, we do find partial support for Hypothesis 1—the
expected increase in fear although not in actual harassment levels.
For Hypothesis 2, although we documented the expected
higher experiences of fear of ethnic and racial harassment for
women in the period prior to the Referendum, we did not
find any stronger change in either experiences or fear of ethnic
and racial harassment in response to the Referendum by sex or
by age. Hypothesis 3 receives some support, however, in that
individuals with a university degree or higher did experience a
stronger increase in fear following the Referendum than those
with less education.
Turning to Hypothesis 4, we test whether we see evidence
of a stronger response to the EU Referendum for EU origin
minorities in terms of either experiences or fear of ethnic and
racial harassment. As can be seen from the statistical tests for
variation, there is no difference in the response across the ethnic
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TABLE 2 | Average marginal effect (AME) of ethnic and racial harassment and fear of such experiences before the EU Referendum.
Ethnic and racial harassmenta Fear of ethnic and racial harassmentb
AME p-values AME p-values
Gender (Ref: Men)
Women −0.01 0.451 0.02* 0.020
Age group (Ref: 16–19 years)
20–29 years 0.02 0.120 −0.01 0.750
30–39 years 0.03 0.188 0.06* 0.034
40–49 years 0.03 0.236 0.05 0.088
50–59 years 0.03 0.503 0.03 0.238
60+ years −0.01 0.616 −0.01 0.837
Highest educational qualifications (No college degree)
Received college degree or higher −0.00 0.982 −0.00 0.794
Information missing −0.02 0.469 −0.05 0.063
Equivalised gross household income quintiles (Ref: Lowest)
2nd quintile −0.01 0.833 0.01 0.739
3rd quintile 0.01 0.733 0.05** 0.003
4th quintile −0.05* 0.015 0.01 0.543
Highest quintile −0.04 0.081 0.01 0.431
Ethnic group (Ref: Born in EU15 countries)
Born in A2A8 0.01 0.638 0.08*** 0.001
Non–white ethnic minorities, born in UK 0.05 0.096 0.10*** 0.000
Non–white ethnic minorities, born outside UK 0.03* 0.033 0.07*** 0.000
Other 0.00 0.821 0.02 0.190
Deprivation level in neighborhood or LSOA (Ref: Lowest)
2nd quartile −0.00 0.890 0.01 0.382
3rd quartile 0.01 0.697 0.05*** 0.000
Highest quartile 0.01 0.644 0.08*** 0.000
Proportion of co–ethnic residents in neighborhood or LSOA (Ref: Lowest)
2nd quartile −0.03 0.294 −0.01 0.542
3rd quartile −0.04* 0.015 −0.04* 0.023
Highest quartile −0.05** 0.005 0.02 0.517
Proportion of voters in the parliamentary constituency who voted for UKIP or BNP in the 2015 General Elections (Ref: Lowest quartile)
2nd quartile −0.01 0.781 0.05** 0.006
3rd quartile −0.01 0.767 0.07*** 0.000
Highest quartile 0.04 0.120 0.04* 0.029
Number of observations 3,004 3,004
aPhysically or verbally attacked in public places in the past 12 months due to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance; bFelt unsafe in public places
the past 12 months due to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance.
Models estimated using data from Understanding Society Wave 7 (2015–2016) using logit with longitudinal (self-completion) weights and standard errors estimated after accounting for
complex survey design; controls included are general health, FT student and partnership status; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
groups for either outcome; if anything, the increase in fear
appears weaker for EU origin minorities.
Finally, we examine variation by the community level
characteristics stated in Hypothesis 5. We do not find any
difference in the experience of ethnic and racial harassment by
type of area that ethnic minorities live in, but we find a stronger
increase in fear of ethnic and racial harassment among ethnic
minorities living in areas of lower deprivation, higher proportion
co-ethnic residents and lower proportion of right wing voters.
These results are surprising and in contrast to what we expected
based on our pre-Referendum results which showed that these
are the “safer areas.” It is possible that the 2016 EU Referendum
results came as a shock in the safer areas and resulted in an
increase of fear.
As a robustness check for temporal variation in changes
in response to the Referendum vote over time, we first tested
whether our finding of a post-Referendum increase in fear of
ethnic and racial harassment would hold if we restricted our
sample only to those respondents who replied at least one year
after the Referendum. The results, in Table A1, still hold. Next,
we partitioned the post-Referendum period into four 6-monthly
periods. The results show that the AME of fear of ethnic and
racial harassment for each post-referendum period is similar,
around 0.03 with a dip to 0.02 during the July-December 2017
period, but these are not statistically significant at the 5% or even
the 10% level of significance (p-values range from 0.13 to 0.25),
possibly due to the smaller sample sizes of each of these categories
(see Table A2). As a sensitivity check we re-estimated all models
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TABLE 3 | Average marginal effect (AME) of the EU Referendum on ethnic and racial harassment and fear of such experiences (for the whole sample, and separately by
sub-groups).
Ethnic and racial harassmenta Fear of ethnic and racial harassmentb








All < 0.001 0.970 0.03** 0.005
for different sub-groups
Gender
Men (reference category) −0.01 0.524 0.03* 0.014
Women 0.01 0.657 0.442 0.02 0.073 0.462
Age group
16–19 years (reference category) 0.01 0.535 0.04 0.316
20–29 years 0.01 0.706 0.809 0.06** 0.005 0.403
30–39 years < 0.01 0.982 0.643 < 0.01 0.962 0.429
40–49 years −0.01 0.318 0.285 0.02 0.316 0.680
50–59 years −0.01 0.833 0.596 0.03 0.208 0.981
60+ years 0.01 0.416 0.739 0.03 0.066 0.499
Highest educational qualifications
No college degree (reference category) −0.02 0.113 0.01 0.508
Received college degree or higher 0.02* 0.041 0.008 0.05*** <0.01 0.026
Information missing 0.02 0.546 0.381 0.06 0.158 0.300
Equivalised gross household income quintiles
Lowest quintile (reference category) −0.02 0.154 0.01 0.563
2nd quintile < 0.01 0.946 0.428 0.07* 0.016 0.222
3rd quintile −0.03 0.062 0.838 −0.04 0.052 0.096
4th quintile 0.03* 0.03 0.002 0.04 0.07 0.413
Highest quintile 0.02 0.322 0.175 0.04** 0.002 0.181
Ethnic and immigration background
Born in EU15 countries (reference category) < 0.01 0.638 0.01 0.213
Born in A2A8 0.01 0.621 0.890 −0.01 0.847 0.395
Non-white ethnic minorities, born in UK < 0.01 0.891 0.619 0.02 0.446 0.515
Non-white ethnic minorities, born outside UK −0.01 0.693 0.552 0.04* 0.016 0.728
Other 0.01 0.599 0.976 0.03 0.054 0.928
Number of observations 10,517 10,517
Deprivation level in the neighborhood or LSOA
Lowest quartile (reference category) 0.01 0.543 0.05** 0.004
2nd quartile −0.01 0.209 0.229 0.01 0.515 0.081
3rd quartile −0.01 0.627 0.488 0.03 0.173 0.137
Highest quartile 0.01 0.544 0.848 0.02 0.29 0.041
Proportion of co-ethnic residents in the neighborhood or LSOA
Lowest quartile (reference category) −0.02 0.211 < 0.01 0.872
2nd quartile 0.02 0.415 0.237 0.06** 0.005 0.037
3rd quartile 0.01 0.643 0.341 0.06* 0.011 0.049
Highest quartile < 0.01 0.787 0.683 −0.01 0.629 0.638
Proportion of voters in the parliamentary constituency who voted for UKIP or BNP in the 2015 General Elections
Lowest quartile (reference category) < 0.01 0.942 0.07*** <0.001
2nd quartile < 0.01 0.969 0.971 0.01 0.570 0.014
3rd quartile 0.03 0.051 0.233 < 0.01 0.900 0.004
Highest quartile −0.04* 0.029 0.365 0.01 0.422 0.023
Number of observations 10,517 10,517
aPhysically or verbally attacked in public places in the past 12 months due to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance; bFelt unsafe in public places
the past 12 months due to one’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance.
Models estimated using data from Understanding Society Waves 7 & 9 (2015–2018) using logit with longitudinal weights and standard errors estimated after accounting for complex
survey design; controls include are general health, FT student and partnership status; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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with the alternative degree variable and the results did not change
(tables are available upon request from the authors).
DISCUSSION
In this paper we set out to estimate whether ethnic minorities in
England experienced an increase in exposure to and fear of ethnic
and racial harassment following the highly politicized, racially
charged, and divisive 2016 EU Referendum. We examined the
experiences of both the primary targets of the Leave campaign,
namely EU origin immigrants, as well as other ethnic minority
groups to assess whether this populist electoral victory would
be associated with an increase in discriminatory practices even
for groups that were not directly targeted. Our nationally
representative data captures ethnic and racial harassment that
would qualify as hate crime, as well asmilder forms of harassment
and feelings of unsafety due to ethnic and racial harassment.
Unlike existing research that relies on police reports, this
paper therefore provides a more comprehensive assessment of
changes in hostility toward ethnic minorities following the EU
Referendum.Moreover, the large sample size and extensive range
of sociodemographic information included in Understanding
Society allows us to assess both individual and regional variation
in changes of experience and fear of harassment following the
Referendum. Finally, even one act of harassment can ripple
through the wider community resulting in increased levels of
fear which as we know has a detrimental effect on mental health
(Nandi et al., 2016). By considering fear of ethnic and racial
harassment we are able to capture the wider consequences of
the Referendum.
Looking at the period 2015–2018, we do not find a statistically
significant increase in reports of ethnic and racial harassment
(physical or verbal attacks perceived to be due to their race,
ethnicity, nationality, language, accent, dress or appearance) in
public places among white and non-white ethnic minorities, but
we do document an increase in fear of such experiences. While
there may have been an increase in hate crimes following the
Referendum (Carr et al., 2020), we could not detect a statistically
significant increase in the milder forms of harassment (which
unlike police recorded hate crimes need not constitute a criminal
offense) that we have considered in our paper. It is possible that
our study lacks the precision to detect short-term (week-long or
month-long) increases in harassment. However, other research
has documented how fear of ethnic and racial harassment tracks
anti-immigrant prejudice (Spörlein and Schlueter, 2020) and
thus it is plausible that the knowledge of this spike in hate
crimes combined with ongoing rhetoric targeting immigrants
particularly from EU countries could be the explanation for the
lasting increase in fear that we find.
While the pre-Brexit period did see an increase in police
reports of hate crimes, there was a steady decline in hate
crimes as reported in the Crime Survey of England and Wales
(Home Office, 2020, p. 19). This discrepancy is possibly due
to improvements in recording of hate crimes by the police.
Like CSEW data, Understanding Society data also shows a
mild decline in proportion of ethnic minorities reporting ethnic
and racial harassment before 2015. It is possible that the EU
Referendum results halted this decline and thus comparison
of the period before and after shows no statistically significant
change. Another possible reason for not finding any increase
in ethnic and racial harassment in our data, is that the EU
referendum led to an increase in online hate crimes (Hardy and
Chakraborti, 2020, p. 4) which is not recorded in Understanding
Society. A third reason could be that there was an increase in hate
crimes reported in institutions and by design this survey under-
represents individuals living in institutions (while respondents
who move into institutions like care homes and universities are
followed, the initial sample is drawn from households only).
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find significantly
higher increases in the experience or fear of ethnic and racial
harassment among immigrants from EU countries, even though
they were the target of the pro-Brexit campaign. We also do
not find a stronger increase in fear among demographic groups
already pre-disposed to higher levels of fear of crime, namely
women or older individuals. The one source of individual level
heterogeneity in the association between the Referendum and
fear of ethnic and racial harassment is education level: those
with a university degree reported a stronger increase in fear
of ethnic and racial harassment post-Referendum than less
educated minorities. This finding aligns with existing research
on the “integration paradox,” which documents greater perceived
discrimination amongmore educated immigrants andminorities
(Verkuyten, 2016; Steinmann, 2019). Better educated minorities
may have higher expectations of fair treatment, as well as
greater contact with the majority population, resulting in more
awareness of the rhetoric surrounding the Referendum and a
stronger sense of fear arising from it. Our research also aligns
with qualitative research on the impact of the Referendum on
experiences of hostility and fear among previously privileged EU
immigrants, that generally found a stronger increase in feelings
of unwelcome and fear for the future rather than actual direct
experiences of ethnic and racial harassment (Luthra, 2021).
This paper also examined a range of correlated, but
conceptually distinct community –level characteristics as
potential moderators of the association between the Referendum
and experiences and fear of ethnic and racial harassment. As
has been found in previous research (Dustmann et al., 2011;
Nandi et al., 2016), we show ethnic and racial harassment is
more prevalent in areas with lower minority concentration
and higher levels of BNP or UKIP support prior to the EU
Referendum. We also show that fear of ethnic and racial
harassment is higher in these areas, as well as in areas that suffer
higher socioeconomic deprivation. In contrast to emerging
research which uses police reports of hate crime (Carr et al.,
2020), we do not, however, find a stronger increase in reports
of ethnic and racial harassment following the Referendum in
areas with more prior right wing party support. To the contrary,
increases in fear following the Referendum were stronger in
areas that were previously “safe”: areas with less deprivation,
higher minority concentration, and weaker prior right-wing
support. Our finding here is corroborated with other recent
studies that argue that Brexit changed the perceptions of what
was “normal” among individuals who were previously less
exposed to anti-immigrant attitudes. For minorities residing in
safer areas, the results of the election more closely approximated
an unexpected shock, creating a larger shift in fear than among
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those residing in more Leave or white majority dominated
areas where anti-immigrant sentiment was potentially more
normalized (Albornoz et al., 2020).
The study we have implemented here takes advantage of
the year-round fieldwork structure and broad ethnic and racial
harassment and fear measures in Understanding Society. Yet
our study is not without limitations. First, although we initially
planned to treat the Referendum vote as an “Unexpected
Event during Survey Design” and employ more stringent causal
inference models to examine its effects, the characteristics of the
event itself as well as the limitations of our data prevented this.
The nature of electoral events themselves threaten the validity
of treating the vote as a random shock in an experimental
design (Muñoz et al., 2020, p. 187), as electoral events are
well-anticipated. Moreover, our respondents are asked to report
on their experiences of ethnic and racial harassment over the
previous year. To capture pre- and post-treatment to reflect this
design, we therefore were forced to test for an increase in ethnic
and racial harassment and fear of ethnic and racial harassment
from a point 1 year after the EU referendum (Table A1). While
our results were robust to this restriction, this is a time point well
beyond the event.
Given that other research generally finds a fairly short-lived
effect of random events on hate crime (Carr et al., 2020; Schilter,
2020) and attitudinal change (Cappiali et al., 2018; although see
also Nägel and Lutter, 2020 for more long term effects), most
causal inference models would have required a large number of
observations directly before and after the event. Unfortunately,
the interview schedule for our sample inUnderstanding Society is
insufficiently clustered around the Referendum date (as discussed
in the Data section) to provide the statistical power necessary to
identify short-term effects.
A second limitation of this study is that, although it
encompasses a wider range of behaviors than police reports
of hate crime, the survey does not include measures of
online ethnic and racial harassment, micro-aggressions6 nor
of ethnically motivated crimes against property (for instance,
defacing immigrant places of worship, businesses or homes).
Recent evidence shows an increase in online hate crimes after
the EU Referendum (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2020, 2020, p. 4).
Third, given the concentration of ethnic minorities in England,
we have restricted our analysis to this country alone, and do
not observe changes in fear and experiences of ethnic and racial
harassment in the other countries of the United Kingdom that
experienced the Referendum vote. Finally, as surveys like CSEW
and Understanding Society are household surveys, institutional
populations are under-represented in the sample.
Despite these shortcomings, there are many offsetting
advantages to using a nationally representative, non-self-selected
6An attempt has been made to capture this form of everyday racism by the End
Everyday Racism project (Available online at: https://racismatcambridge.org).
survey. What we can show with our data is a general increase
in fear following the Referendum that has endured well-beyond
the initial announcement of the election results, and that it varies
across different subpopulations. While the spike in hate crimes
following the referendum may not have translated into a spike in
milder forms of harassment, this spike along with the negative
portrayal of immigrants, particularly from EU, may have been
instrumental in increasing fear of ethnic and racial harassment
among Britain’s ethnic minorities—all ethnic minorities not just
those who were the target of the Leave campaign. The campaign
to Leave the EU with its rhetoric of demonizing migrants and
use of phrases like “swarms of immigrants” may have taken a toll
on the well-being of Britain’s ethnic minorities. Our finding that
the Referendum increased fear of ethnic and racial harassment
among those who are more privileged and living in safer areas
points toward a widespread and perhaps long-lasting increase
in fear.
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